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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

UNIVERSAL DETERMINISM AND RELATIVE DETERMINATION

Leroy N. Meyer
Department of Philosophy
University of South Dakota
Vermillion, South Dakota 57069

have been developed. There is of course a variety of versions
of determinism, but of primary concern here is one general
kind of physical determinism, which may be called universal
determinism, though remarks extend to some other kinds of
deterministic theses as well.

Recent works have shown that it is possible to devise a clear
thesis of universal determinism. Two such theses are formulated. Apparently the motivations for universal determinism have been: (I) to
account for the explanatory power of scientific laws, (2) to support
the principle of sufficient reason, and (3) to provide a methodological
criterion for scientific progress. Universal determinism is, however,
unsatisfactory in view of its apparent conflict with important physical
theories such as quantum mechanics. The question then arises whether
there is a weaker thesis, compatible with contemporary physical
theories, that satisfies the motivation for universal determinism. A
thesis of relative determination that satisfies these conditions is proposed.

t

t

Assuming that a clear statement of a thesis of determinism can be presented, the question of its fundamental interest
must be asked. Von Wright's view is that philosophers are
primarily interested in the logical possibility of determinism.
Von Wright (1974:121) wrote:

t
... Interest in causes and deterministic developments
[might] be replaced by an interest in probabilistic
developments. This change of attitude could be
entirely satisfying to the scientist. But would neither
solve nor eliminate the philosopher's puzzlement
about determinism as in its logical possibility. His
interest concerns the self-consistency of a certain
idea with ideas concerning action and human freedom.

INTRODUCTION
The nest of philosophical views grouped under the term
determinism has a long history extending back to pre-Socratic
science and philosophy. In particular, theories of physical
determinism have commanded considerable attention throughout the history of philosophy. One sort of physical deterministic thesis, or other, has been a foundational part of most
systems of explanation of physical phenomena. Physical determinism arose as complementary to the materialist systems
devised by the ancient Megarian philosopher-scientists, and it
was perpetuated later by the Epicureans in Athens. Among
the most explicit proponents of a thesis of physical determinism were Leibniz and Laplace.

Surely, philosophers are interested in this question, and it
seems logically preliminary; but the ultimate issue regarding
any form of determinism is whether or not there is a deterministic thesis that should be believed. It shall be argued that
the apparent basis for belief of universal determinism is unsound.

Many contemporary philosophers would agree with
Austin (1970:231) that in the 1950s the expression "Determinism" did not name a clear philosophical view. Since the
time of Austin's criticism, however, there has been some
progress in the direction of clarifying precisely what is a
deterministic system. There has been extensive clarification
of the notions of causal explanation, event, and causal law. In
recent years several precise statements of deterministic theses

It is unsatisfactory, however, simp~y to let the matter
rest at a point at which universal determinism has no apparent
sound basis. For, strong beliefs led to a tentative belief in universal determinism, and it might yet be hoped that a sound
basis for some deterministic theses exists. Therefore, a modest
alternative to universal determinism that does justice to
sound considerations regarding causality, causal law, events,
and scientific explanation shall be proposed. The alternative
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framework for conceiving of causal systems is here called
"relative determination."
First the meaning of relative determination is explained,
and then three deterministic theses: classical universal determinism (CUD), modern universal determinism (MUD), and
universal relative determination (URD) are distinguished. Next
it will be important to try to understand and scrutinize the
underlying motivation for a deterministic thesis such as CUD
or MUD in order to determine the extent to which URD might
serve the same purpose. There are important reasons for rejecting MUD as well as CUD which shall be reviewed. It shall be
argued that such reasons for rejecting conventional universal
deterministic theses do not apply to URD. Thus, URD can be
viewed as a modest improvement over conventional theses
such as MUD and CUD. Finally, the logical relation between
MUD and URD is discussed.

RELATNE DETERMINATION
By "relative determination" is meant a relation that holds
between a scientific law (or more generally, an entire theory)
and two sets of descriptive statements. Before citing the rigor·
ous definition of this relation, what is intended by the expres·
sion is explained. Two non-simultaneous events are related
to each other in accordance with some law, to the extent that
a true, partial description of the earlier event together with the
law are logically consistent with a description of the subsequent event. (Indeed, it is my view that there are no complete
descriptions.) In the loosest sense of the term, the prior event
description is said to determine the subsequent event description relative to the law.
Since this loose sense would seem of little use, the account should be ramified to say that the prior event description determines the subsequent one relative to the law in
question, provided that the conjunction of the prior event
description and the law entail some sub-description of the
subsequent event description, as well as be consistent with
it. To say that a set of descriptions r of some event El determines the set of descriptions L of an event E2 relative to a
scientific law A is to say that: (1) rand L jointly entail that
El temporally preceded E2; (2) the conjunction of r, L, and
A is consistent; and (3) there are disjoint and logically independent subsets of L, say ai, and a2 such that the conjunction of r, A, and al entails some conjunction of elements
of a2.
As an example, the events of shooting a billiard cue ball
northward and its subsequent hitting of an object ball lying to
the north can be pictured. The description of hitting the cue
ball in a northerly direction together with certain laws of mechanics entails that the ball not travel in a southerly direction

before hitting some other object. Hitting the ball northward
determines (relative to mechanics) that it will not strike a
ball lying southward before hitting something else. If the
description of the subsequent event includes a statement to
the effect that the event takes place in a position that is not
to the south of the position of the cue ball at the beginning of
the prior event, and if all other aspects of the description of
the subsequent event are consistent with the prior event
description and the law, the prior event description determines
the subsequent event description relative to the law. It is as if
to say the law and the prior event description narrow down
the subsequent possibilities which can be reflected in descrip_
tions of subsequent events. The entailment of interest in this
example is simply that of the sub-description, "the cue ball
passes through a spot north of its initial position at time t,"
by the conjunction of the law and a sufficient description of
the prior event.
An obvious objection to this use of the term "determina.
tion" in connection with this relation is that the relatively
determined events may in an intuitive sense be undetermined
by the prior event. To this it must be replied simply that it is
an arbitrary decision to use the term. There is, however, a
further reason for using the term in this manner. It is the
view here that determination varies in degrees, and that
it may be the case that there is no highest degree of deter·
mination (no complete determination). Thus, it makes sense
to speak of even the degenerate cases of "relative determination" as cases of fairly low degree of determination in the
pre-formal sense. Thus, it seems that the thesis of Universal
Relative Determination, to be explained shortly in terms
of the above definition, can be correctly viewed as a deterministic thesis.

THREE DETERMINISTIC THESES:
CUD, MUD, AND URD
In many respects, CUD is a paradigm of a universal deterministic thesis. Its roots lie in antiquity, but its recent history
stems from Laplace (1952: 16). In its roughest form, CUD says
that every event is causally determined by prior events. This
can be made more precise in the following manner:
Given any description of an event (provided it is
accurate) there are causal laws of the universe (in
principle) such that the event description follows
logically from the laws together with accurate descriptions of prior events (descriptions that can in principle be given to any degree of detail).
There are difficulties with CUD primarily stemming from the
question of whether it is an epistemological thesis or not (i.e.,
whether or not it is to be understood as claiming that there
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are knowable laws and descriptions corresponding to every
knowable description).
It is unnecessary to ruminate on CUD, however, for even
if the issues peculiar to it are cleared up there are further concerns common to it and its more modern cousin, MUD, that
can be made clear. That there is a clear statement of universal
determinism can be appreciated by a study of parts I and II
of the writing of Berofsky (1971). The formulation of modern
universal determinism (MUD) here is compatible with Berofsky's definition (see Berofsky, 1971 :268-269). Berofsky
developed important restrictions on descriptions and laws that
should apply to this account as well. This account differs from
his also in separating the notion of "deterministic system" and
then stating the thesis in terms of that notion. By "deterministic system" it is meant that:

A collection of (possibly) interacting bodies forms a
deterministic system under a set of causal laws if at
any given moment any assertion that truly describes
subsequent states of the system is deducible from the
causal laws together with some true description of
the state of the system at the given moment in question.
The thesis of MUD is then:
The Universe is a deterministic system of its particles
under the set of the laws of nature.
Although the broadest deterministic thesis possible is exhibited, it is possible to present theses corresponding to
portions of modern science (such as "sub-atomic particles
constitute a deterministic system under the yet undiscovered
laws of physics"). Such corollary theses are subject to the
discussion that follows regarding MUD.
In order to state an alternative to MUD, the definition of
relative determination must be recalled:
A prior event description determines a subsequent
one relative to a law in question, provided that the
conjunction of the prior event description and the
law entail some sub-description of the subsequent
event description, as well as be consistent with it.
The thesis of universal relative determination is:
Every true event description implies an event description that is determined in the appropriate sense by
some other true event description relative to some
law (not necessarily causal).
More precisely URD says:

For every true description of an event E 1 , there is a
true description of another event E2 and a scientific
law A such that E2 determines E1 relative to A.

URD AND THE MOTIY A nON FOR MUD
Any motivation for putting forth MUD is closely tied to
the question of its rejection. Just what criteria are relevant
for rejection of MUD depend upon what questions are supposedly answered by it. There seem to be three motivations
for MUD: (1) the desire for an account of the explanatory
power of the entire body of scientific laws, both known and
yet unknown; (2) an interest in supporting the principle of
sufficient reason; and (3) the need for a methodological criterion for relative progress of scientific theories.
It might seem clear that MUD is a meta theoretic statement regarding scientific explanations insofar as it makes
reference to scientific laws. It appears to be a generalization
about the explanatory power of all causal laws collectively
(whether discovered or not). In that case MUD addresses the
question: "What are the explanatory limits of scientific laws
as a whole?" The motivation would then be to provide a
holistic basis for the explanatory power of scientific laws.
Thus, MUD says that any phenomenon describable in principle,
is in principle explainable.

A similar, but rather unclear motivation for MUD would
be to support the principle of sufficient reason. Despite Laplace's (1952) apparent argument to the converse, the principle of sufficient reason (if such a thing can be clearly stated)
should be implied by CUD. Thus, MUD should imply the
principle of sufficient reason.
A quite different motivation for MUD is to provide a
methodological standard for scientific explanation. This is
different from the first motivation in an important respect.
The earlier concern was for the logical possibility of causal
explanation; whereas now demands that should be placed on a
scientific explanation are of concern. According to MUD then,
mature science should be expected to provide theoretic models
of deterministic systems under causal laws in explanation of
describable phenomena. Theories that do not achieve this goal
are relatively immature according to MUD.
To account for scientific explanation seems a respectable
hope, though perhaps unrealistic. MUD attempts to address
the question as to the limits of scientific laws by saying that
in fact causal laws are unlimited. In light of modern physics,
MUD has been challenged on this very issue, which shall be
addressed when the rejection of MUD is considered. On the
other hand, support of the principle of sufficient reason appears more difficult to appreciate as a reason for trying to
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defend MUD, principally because of its own obscurity. The
most worthy motivation for MUD is (3), need for a criterion
of scientific progress.
There surely is an important role for a criterion (or criteria, for that matter) to judge scientific theories as to their
relative progress in explanation. MUD suggests that progress
is made by developing more extensive deterministic system
models. Thus, a theory that provides a more complete deterministic system is to be preferred. This may be a misleading
criterion as later consideration will tend to show. For, it would
lead to the choice of a causal hypothesis over a statistical
hypothesis even where the statistical one is more far reaching
and unifies more theories.
It is not difficult to appreciate that URD tends to satisfy
the need for a criterion of progress in science. Since URD
provides that there are relative deterministic explanations (in
the form of laws and descriptions of prior events) for any
desirable phenomena, on the basis of URD an explanatory
theory and observational research should be expected to yield
such descriptions and laws. A quite natural way to judge relative progress, on the basis of URD, would be in terms of an
increase in relative determination.

Concerning motivation (1) to account for scientific explanation, URD does not provide a precise answer, for it is
very modest compared to MUD. It does, however, entail at
least that it is always possible in principle to provide some
relative-deterministic explanation for any given describable
phenomena. Thus, URD tells something about limits of
scientific explanation. It tells that there are not epistemologically discrete event descriptions in the sense that in principle
every event description that is true can be related to some
other event description in accordance with a law.
Even motivation (2), the interest in the principle of sufficient reason, might be seen as satisfied by URD, depending
upon what the principle of sufficient reason is taken to be. But
this point is not pressed, for little coherent substance to the
alleged principle is to be found.

URDAND
THE REJECTION OF MUD
Perhaps most contemporary philosophers do not accept
MUD. But the reasons for its rejection are quite diverse, and
there apparently is little consensus among those who have an
educated opinion. The most prominent conditions for rejection of MUD are:
(1) falsification of MUD (as some libertarians seem
to argue, regarding CUD);

(2) incoherence of MUD, as Austin (1970:231) argued;
(3) incompatibility of MUD with other important
beliefs (such as free will, or a particular understanding of Heisenberg's uncertainty principle);

and to this list one condition should be added:
(4) implausibility of MUD.
Some contemporary philosophers seem to hold that
condition (1) is satisfied, that MUD is falsified by quantum
mechanics and molecular theory of gases. Berofsky (1971:
287-288) pointed out, however, that a theory of statistical
laws is not necessarily indeterministic. Still there are arguments, to which Berofsky alluded, to the effect that quantum
mechanics is essentially indeterministic. (More of this point
is discussed below.) The view that freedom of the Will conflicts with MUD, and that freedom is undeniably experienced
satisfies the condition of falsification. But none of these views
seems as yet articulated clearly enough to falsify MUD conclusively.
The condition of incoherence seems unsatisfied by MUD
or by Berofsky's (1971:285) definition of determinism. Even
if MUD is unclear in certain respects, it can be clarified along
the lines of Berofsky's account. Von Wright (1974:99-106)
offered still another coherent statement of universal determinism. (I differ with Von Wright in stating deterministic
theses in terms of event descriptions, rather than systems state
changes. My account is more in keeping with Berofsky's.)
On the other hand MUD does seem to conflict with quantum mechanics in a serious way. [Von Wright (1974) alluded
to this point in the earlier quote.] Roughly put, the problem
is that as a logical consequence of quantum mechanics if a
particle can be precisely located, then the particle's energy
will be indeterminate. According to Hanson (1967), Heisenberg's uncertainty prinCiple is the generalization of this limitation. Some have objected to the claim that the uncertainty
principle be regarded as being incompatible with determinism,
on the grounds that Heisenberg's principle is merely an epistemological limitation that is incompatible only with deterministic theses which are essentially epistemological. (Notice
that whether quantum mechanics is true, as would be important with respect to the condition of falsification, is not now
considered.) It must be realized that according to the uncertainty principle it is impossible in principle to determine both
the energy and the location of a particle at a given time.
What might be basis for supposing then that both properties
are in fact precisely determined by prior states of the Universe?
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These latest remarks, however, are insufficient to show
that the third condition of incompatibility with other beliefs is
satisfied by MUD with respect to quantum mechanics. On the
other hand, they are appropriate in showing that MUD is implaUSible which is just condition (4). As a characterization of
scientific explanation, MUD is implausible in light of actual
scientific explanations.
Two of the motivations for MUD should be recalled: (1)
the desire for an account of explanatory power of scientific
laws and (3) the need for a methodological criterion for relative progress of scientific theories. On the basis of the uncertainty principle, it is implausible to make such a claim as MUD
which makes an unwarranted generalization about the explanatory power of causal laws. It is doubtful that causal laws,
even collectively, have the power MUD claims for them in the
light of modern physics.
Concerning its service in satisfying the motive that there
is need for a criterion of progress, MUD seems misleading as a
criterion for scientific progress. It seems extremely implausible to regard quantum mechanics as immature compared to
causal explanations of the same phenomena it addresses solely
on grounds of MUD. As Hanson (1967:45) pointed out,
quantum mechanics has more explanatory power than rival
accounts insofar as it uniquely covers diverse phenomena. It
seems more plausible to regard MUD as representative of a
relatively immature concept of explanation in view of modern
physics. Defense of MUD on grounds that modern physics may
be retrogressive seems an even less plausible line.
As a result of these considerations there is reason to reject
MUD. Surely, it seems not to fulfill its intended function in a
reasonable way. On the other hand, URD would seem to survive each of the conditions for rejection entertained here.
URD is certainly too weak to be falsified by an experience of
freedom even if MUD can be falsified. In fact, URD seems very
unlikely to conflict with important and relevant beliefs so that
it survives the condition of incompatibility with other important theories, as well as the condition of falsification. It surely
does not conflict with quantum mechanics. URD does not
require that every feature of an event be entailed by some law
and prior event descriptions, and it does not specify that the
relevant laws be causal.
As for the plausibility of URD, earlier remarks regarding
motivations might be recalled. URD would not lead to expectation of a causal explanation instead of a statistical one, when
a causal one should not be expected in the context of contemporary physics. According to URD there are no discrete
event descriptions. True event descriptions can always be
related to others in accordance with some law. Thus, in the
sense of relative determination, every describable phenomenon is explanable. This is more plausible than MUD insofar

as the history of science seems to disallow this without exception, whereas science does not nullify MUD unexceptionally.

CONCLUSION
Universal relative determination satisfies the most important motivations for espousing modern universal determinism,
and in that sense URD can be viewed as an alternative to
MUD. Furthermore, there are strong grounds for rejecting
MUD and no similar grounds against URD. On the basis of
these two points, it should be concluded that there is a philosophical justification for replacing MUD with URD.
There are, however, serious limitations to the importance
of URD as implicitly admitted throughout this paper. URD is
a very modest claim compared with MUD. They are compatible with each other. Indeed MUD implied URD. But, because
of URD's greater generality than MUD, it is a weaker claim
than MUD. Consequently, although it tends towards satisfying the motivations for an expression of the limits of scientific
explanation and for a methodological criterion for scientific
progress, URD does not satisfy these motivations completely,
in the manner in which MUD might be thought to do, if it
were acceptable. Much more should be said as to the limits
of explanation and in regard for standards for determining
relative scientific progress.
In its modest way URD performs a philosophical function:
it articulates a logical relation that holds between phenomenal
descriptions and laws of science, and asserts that we should
expect such a relation to obtain. That URD does not, and
cannot, perform the strong philosophical function that Laplace (1952) intended for CUD, and more recent determinists
intended for MUD, ought not to be disappointing. For both
MUD and CUD tend to stultify contemporary conceptions of
scientific explanation and scientific progress rather than complementing those conceptions; whereas, URD does complement notions of explanation and progress. Reason advises
that the implausible principle, MUD, be ignored in favor of
the more modest, but plausible, URD with full intentions of
continuing careful reflections on the conceptual framework
of explanation of natural phenomena.

,
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